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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The dispute at the bottom of this putative class action 
began when two laptops, containing sensitive personal 
information, were stolen from health insurer Horizon 
Healthcare Services, Inc.  The four named Plaintiffs filed suit 
on behalf of themselves and other Horizon customers whose 
personal information was stored on those laptops.  They 
allege willful and negligent violations of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., as well 
as numerous violations of state law.  Essentially, they say that 
Horizon inadequately protected their personal information.  
The District Court dismissed the suit under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of Article III standing.  
According to the Court, none of the Plaintiffs had claimed a 
cognizable injury because, although their personal 
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information had been stolen, none of them had adequately 
alleged that the information was actually used to their 
detriment. 
 
 We will vacate and remand.  In light of the 
congressional decision to create a remedy for the 
unauthorized transfer of personal information, a violation of 
FCRA gives rise to an injury sufficient for Article III standing 
purposes.  Even without evidence that the Plaintiffs’ 
information was in fact used improperly, the alleged 
disclosure of their personal information created a de facto 
injury.  Accordingly, all of the Plaintiffs suffered a cognizable 
injury, and the Complaint should not have been dismissed 
under Rule 12(b)(1). 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 A. Factual Background1 
 
 Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc., d/b/a Horizon Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey (“Horizon”) is a New 
Jersey-based company that provides health insurance 
products and services to approximately 3.7 million members.  
In the regular course of its business, Horizon collects and 
maintains personally identifiable information (e.g., names, 
                                              
1 Because this is an appeal from the District Court’s 
grant of a motion to dismiss, we recite the facts as alleged and 
make all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor.  
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 
1384 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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dates of birth, social security numbers, and addresses) and 
protected health information (e.g., demographic information, 
medical histories, test and lab results, insurance information, 
and other care-related data) on its customers and potential 
customers.  The named Plaintiffs – Courtney Diana, Mark 
Meisel, Karen Pekelney, and Mitchell Rindner2 – and other 
class members are or were participants in, or as Horizon puts 
it, members of Horizon insurance plans.  They entrusted 
Horizon with their personal information.3   
 
 Horizon’s privacy policy states that the company 
“maintain[s] appropriate administrative, technical and 
physical safeguards to reasonably protect [members’] Private 
                                              
2 Only Diana was listed as a named Plaintiff in the 
original complaint.  Plaintiffs Pekelney and Meisel filed a 
separate putative class action complaint on January 28, 2014.  
Pekelney and Meisel then filed a motion to consolidate the 
cases on February 10, 2014.  Horizon joined the motion.  The 
cases were consolidated and Rindner was later added as a 
Plaintiff in the amended complaint.  We will refer to the 
amended complaint as “the Complaint.” 
 
3 The Complaint identifies the class members as: “All 
persons whose personal identifying information (PII) or 
protected health information (PHI) were contained on the 
computers stolen from Horizon’s Newark, New Jersey office 
on or about November 1-3, 2013.”  (App. at 44.)  For ease of 
reference, we will refer to “personally identifiable 
information” and “protected health information” – a 
distinction made by the Complaint – together as “personal 
information.” 
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Information.”  (App. at 29.)  The policy also provides that, 
any time Horizon relies on a third party to perform a business 
service using personal information, it requires the third party 
to “safeguard [members’] Private Information” and “agree to 
use it only as required to perform its functions for [Horizon] 
and as otherwise permitted by … contract and the law.”  
(App. at 29.)  Through the policy, Horizon pledges to “notify 
[members of its insurance plans] without unreasonable delay” 
of any breach of privacy.  (App. at 29.) 
 
 During the weekend of November 1st to 3rd, 2013, 
two laptop computers containing the unencrypted personal 
information of the named Plaintiffs and more than 839,000 
other Horizon members were stolen from Horizon’s 
headquarters in Newark, New Jersey.  The Complaint alleges 
that “[t]he facts surrounding the Data Breach demonstrate that 
the stolen laptop computers were targeted due to the storage 
of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ highly sensitive and private 
[personal information] on them.”  (App. at 32.)  Horizon 
discovered the theft the following Monday, and notified the 
Newark Police Department that day.  It alerted potentially 
affected members by letter and a press release a month later, 
on December 6.  The press release concerning the incident 
noted that the computers “may have contained files with 
differing amounts of member information, including name 
and demographic information (e.g., address, member 
identification number, date of birth), and in some instances, a 
Social Security number and/or limited clinical information.” 
(App. at 33.)   
 
 Horizon offered one year of credit monitoring and 
identity theft protection services to those affected, which the 
Plaintiffs allege was inadequate to remedy the effects of the 
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data breach.  At a January 2014 New Jersey Senate hearing, 
“Horizon confirmed that it had not encrypted all of its 
computers that contained [personal information].”  (App. at 
35.)  Thereafter, “Horizon allegedly established safeguards to 
prevent a similar incident in the future—including tougher 
policies and stronger encryption processes that could have 
been implemented prior to the Data Breach and prevented it.”  
(App. at 35.) 
 
 Some personal history about the named Plaintiffs is 
included in the Complaint.  Diana, Meisel, and Pekelney are 
all citizens and residents of New Jersey who were Horizon 
members who received letters from Horizon indicating that 
their personal information was on the stolen laptops.  The 
Complaint does not include any allegation that their identities 
were stolen as a result of the data breach.  Plaintiff Rindner is 
a citizen and resident of New York.  He was a Horizon 
member but was not initially notified of the data breach.  
After Rindner contacted Horizon in February 2014, the 
company confirmed that his personal information was on the 
stolen computers.  The Plaintiffs allege that, “[a]s a result of 
the Data Breach, a thief or thieves submitted to the [IRS] a 
fraudulent Income Tax Return for 2013 in Rindner’s and his 
wife’s names and stole their 2013 income tax refund.”  (App. 
at 27.)  Rindner eventually did receive the refund, but “spent 
time working with the IRS and law enforcement … to remedy 
the effects” of the fraud, “incurred other out-of-pocket 
expenses to remedy the identity theft[,]” and was “damaged 
financially by the related delay in receiving his tax refund.”  
(App. at 27, 41.)  After that fraudulent tax return, someone 
also fraudulently attempted to use Rindner’s credit card 
number in an online transaction.  Rindner was also “recently 
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denied retail credit because his social security number has 
been associated with identity theft.”  (App. at 27.) 
 
 B. Procedural Background 
 
 The Plaintiffs filed suit on June 27, 2014.  Count I of 
the Complaint claims that Horizon committed a willful 
violation of FCRA; Count II alleges a negligent violation of 
FCRA; and the remaining counts allege various violations of 
state law.4  FCRA was enacted in 1970 “to ensure fair and 
accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking 
system, and protect consumer privacy.”  Safeco Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007).  With respect to 
consumer privacy, the statute imposes certain requirements 
on any “consumer reporting agency” that “regularly ... 
assembl[es] or evaluat[es] consumer credit information ... for 
the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.”  
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).  Any such agency that either willfully 
                                              
4 In particular, Count III alleges negligence; Count IV 
alleges breach of contract; Count V alleges an invasion of 
privacy; Count VI alleges unjust enrichment; Count VII 
alleges a violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; 
Count VIII alleges a failure to destroy certain records, in 
violation of N.J.S.A. § 56:8-162; Count IX alleges a failure to 
promptly notify customers following the security breach, in 
violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; and Count 
X alleges a violation of the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, 
Warranty and Notice Act.  In their response to Horizon’s 
motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs consented to the dismissal of 
Count X without prejudice.   
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or negligently “fails to comply with any requirement imposed 
under [FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to that 
consumer.”  Id. §§ 1681n(a) (willful violations); 1681o(a) 
(negligent violations). 
 
 In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert that Horizon is 
a consumer reporting agency and that it violated FCRA in 
several respects.  They say that Horizon “furnish[ed]” their 
information in an unauthorized fashion by allowing it to fall 
into the hands of thieves.  (App. at 48.)  They also allege that 
Horizon fell short of its FCRA responsibility to adopt 
reasonable procedures5 to keep sensitive information 
confidential.6  According to the Plaintiffs, Horizon’s failure to 
                                              
5 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) states: 
 
Reasonable procedures [-] It is the purpose of 
this subchapter to require that consumer 
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures 
for meeting the needs of commerce for 
consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other 
information in a manner which is fair and 
equitable to the consumer, with regard to the 
confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper 
utilization of such information in accordance 
with the requirements of this subchapter. 
 
6 “In addition to properly securing and monitoring the 
stolen laptop computers and encrypting Plaintiffs’ and Class 
Members’ [personal information] on the computers,” Horizon 
should have – according to the Complaint – conducted 
periodic risk assessments to identify vulnerabilities, 
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protect their personal information violated the company’s 
responsibility under FCRA to maintain the confidentiality of 
their personal information.7   
 
 The Plaintiffs seek statutory,8 actual, and punitive 
damages, an injunction to prevent Horizon from continuing to 
                                                                                                     
developed information security performance metrics, and 
taken steps to monitor and secure the room and areas where 
the laptops were stored.  (App. at 48-49.)  Therefore, say the 
Plaintiffs, “Horizon failed to take reasonable and appropriate 
measures to secure the stolen laptop computers and safeguard 
and protect Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ [personal 
information].”  (App. at 49.) 
 
7 Section 1681a(d)(3) of title 15 of the U.S. Code 
imposes a restriction, with certain exceptions, on the sharing 
of medical information with any persons not related by 
common ownership or affiliated by corporate control.  
Section 1681b(g)(1) states that “[a] consumer reporting 
agency shall not furnish for employment purposes, or in 
connection with a credit or insurance transaction, a consumer 
report that contains medical information … about a 
consumer,” with certain limited exceptions.  
Section 1681c(a)(6) states that a consumer reporting agency 
cannot, with limited exceptions, make a consumer report 
containing “[t]he name, address, and telephone number of any 
medical information furnisher that has notified the agency of 
its status … .” 
 
8 FCRA permits statutory damages, but only for willful 
violations.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (“Any person who 
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store personal information in an unencrypted manner, 
reimbursement for ascertainable losses, pre- and post-
judgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and “such other 
and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.” 
(App. at 64.) 
 
 Horizon moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).  The District Court 
granted dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), ruling that the 
Plaintiffs lack Article III standing.  The Court concluded that, 
even taking the Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, they did not 
have standing because they had not suffered a cognizable 
injury.  Because the Court granted Horizon’s Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion, it did not address Horizon’s Rule 12(b)(6) arguments 
and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
remaining state law claims.   
 
 The Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal.   
                                                                                                     
willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under 
this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that 
consumer in an amount equal to the sum of … any actual 
damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure 
or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 … 
.”). 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction over the 
Plaintiffs’ FCRA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, though 
it ultimately concluded that it did not have jurisdiction due to 
the lack of standing.  Having decided that the Plaintiffs did 
not have standing under FCRA, the District Court also 
concluded that it “lack[ed] discretion to retain supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law claims” under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367. (App. at 23 (citation omitted).)  See Storino v. 
Borough of Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(holding that “because the [plaintiffs] lack standing, the 
District Court lacked original jurisdiction over the federal 
claim, and it therefore could not exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction”).  We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 Our review of the District Court’s dismissal of a 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) is de novo.  United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. 
Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2007).  Two 
types of challenges can be made under Rule 12(b)(1) – “either 
a facial or a factual attack.”  Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 
333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016).  That distinction is significant 
because, among other things, it determines whether we accept 
as true the non-moving party’s facts as alleged in its 
pleadings.  Id. (noting that with a factual challenge, “[n]o 
presumptive truthfulness attaches to [the] plaintiff’s 
allegations … .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (second 
alteration in original)).  Here, the District Court concluded 
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that Horizon’s motion was a facial challenge because it 
“attack[ed] the sufficiency of the consolidated complaint on 
the grounds that the pleaded facts d[id] not establish 
constitutional standing.”  (App. at 10.)  We agree.  Because 
Horizon did not challenge the validity of any of the Plaintiffs’ 
factual claims as part of its motion, it brought only a facial 
challenge.  It argues that the allegations of the Complaint, 
even accepted as true, are insufficient to establish the 
Plaintiffs’ Article III standing.   
 
 In reviewing facial challenges to standing, we apply 
the same standard as on review of a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6).  See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 
299 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting “that the standard is the same 
when considering a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1) or a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6)” (citation omitted)).  Consequently, we accept the 
Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw 
all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the 
Plaintiffs’ favor.9  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
                                              
9 In its 12(b)(6) motion, which is not before us, 
Horizon questions whether it is bound by FCRA.  In 
particular, Horizon suggests that it is not a “consumer 
reporting agency” and therefore is not subject to the 
requirements of FCRA.  At oral argument, Horizon also 
argued that FCRA does not apply when data is stolen rather 
than voluntarily “furnish[ed],”  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).  
Because we are faced solely with an attack on standing, we 
do not pass judgment on the merits of those questions.  Our 
decision should not be read as expanding a claimant’s rights 
under FCRA.  Rather, we assume for purposes of this appeal 
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(2009).  Nevertheless, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements 
of [standing], supported by mere conclusory statements, do 
not suffice.”  Id.  We disregard such legal conclusions.  
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss [for lack of 
standing], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter” 
that would establish standing if accepted as true.  Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007)).  
 
 There are three well-recognized elements of Article III 
standing:  First, an “injury in fact,” or an “invasion of a 
legally protected interest” that is “concrete and 
particularized.”  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992).  Second, a “causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of[.]”  Id.  And third, a likelihood 
“that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”  Id. 
at 561 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 This appeal centers entirely on the injury-in-fact 
element of standing – more specifically, on the concreteness 
requirement of that element.10  
                                                                                                     
that FCRA was violated, as alleged, and analyze standing 
with that assumption in mind.  Likewise, our decision 
regarding Article III standing does not resolve whether 
Plaintiffs have suffered compensable damages.  Some injuries 
may be “enough to open the courthouse door” even though 
they ultimately are not compensable.  Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 
614, 625 (2004).  
10 There is no doubt that the Plaintiffs complain of a 
particularized injury – the disclosure of their own private 
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 “In the context of a motion to dismiss, we have held 
that the [i]njury-in-fact element is not Mount Everest.  The 
contours of the injury-in-fact requirement, while not precisely 
defined, are very generous, requiring only that claimant 
allege[ ] some specific, identifiable trifle of injury.”  Blunt v. 
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted) (second alteration in original).  “At the pleading 
stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the 
defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss 
we presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific 
facts that are necessary to support the claim.”  Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 561 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alteration in original). 
 
 The requirements for standing do not change in the 
class action context.  “[N]amed plaintiffs who represent a 
class must allege and show that they personally have been 
injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, 
unidentified members of the class to which they belong and 
which they purport to represent.”  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 
343, 357 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to 
represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or 
controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on 
                                                                                                     
information.  Spokeo, Inc. v Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 
(2016) (“For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect 
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’” (quoting 
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1. (1992))). 
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behalf of himself or any other member of the class.”  O’Shea 
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).11  Accordingly, at least 
one of the four named Plaintiffs must have Article III 
standing in order to maintain this class action. 
 
 B. Analysis of the Plaintiffs’ Standing  
 
 All four of the named Plaintiffs argue that the violation 
of their statutory rights under FCRA gave rise to a cognizable 
and concrete injury that satisfies the first element of Article 
III standing.  They claim that the violation of their statutory 
right to have their personal information secured against 
unauthorized disclosure constitutes, in and of itself, an injury 
in fact.  The District Court rejected that argument, concluding 
that standing requires some form of additional, “specific 
                                              
11 Once Article III standing “is determined vis-à-vis 
the named parties … there remains no further separate class 
standing requirement in the constitutional sense.”  In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 
148 F.3d 283, 306-07 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, “unnamed, putative 
class members need not establish Article III standing.  
Instead, the ‘cases or controversies’ requirement is satisfied 
so long as a class representative has standing, whether in the 
context of a settlement or litigation class.”  Neale v. Volvo 
Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2015); see 
also 2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions 
§ 2:8 (5th ed. 2012); id. § 2:1 (“Once threshold individual 
standing by the class representative is met, a proper party to 
raise a particular issue is before the court; there is no further, 
separate ‘class action standing’ requirement.”). 
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harm,” beyond “mere violations of statutory and common law 
rights[.]”  (App. at 15-16.)   
 
 In the alternative, the Plaintiffs argue that Horizon’s 
violation of FCRA “placed [them] at an imminent, 
immediate, and continuing increased risk of harm from 
identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud … .”  (App. at 
40.)  They say the increased risk constitutes a concrete injury 
for Article III standing purposes.  In their Complaint, they 
assert that those whose personal information has been stolen 
are “approximately 9.5 times more likely than the general 
public to suffer identity fraud or identity theft.”  (App. at 36.)  
They go on to note the various ways that identity thieves can 
inflict injury, such as draining a bank account, filing for a tax 
refund in another’s name, or getting medical treatment using 
stolen health insurance information.  The District Court 
rejected that argument as well because it found that any future 
risk of harm necessarily depended on the “conjectural 
conduct of a third party bandit,” and was, therefore, too 
“attenuated” to sustain standing.  (App. at 18.) (relying on 
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011)).12   
                                              
12 On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that Horizon’s offer of 
free credit monitoring can be taken as proof that Horizon 
“knows that its conduct has put Plaintiffs and Class Members 
at a significantly increased risk of identity theft.”  (Opening 
Br. at 8.)  We agree with Horizon that its offer should not be 
used against it as a concession or recognition that the 
Plaintiffs have suffered injury.  We share its concern that such 
a rule would “disincentivize[] companies from offering credit 
or other monitoring services in the wake of a breach.”  
(Answering Br. at 19.)  Cf. FED. R. EVID. 407-08 (excluding 
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 We resolve this appeal on the basis of Plaintiffs’ first 
argument and conclude that they have standing due to 
Horizon’s alleged violation of FCRA. 
 
 That the violation of a statute can cause an injury in 
fact and grant Article III standing is not a new doctrine.  The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the ability of 
Congress to “cast the standing net broadly” and to grant 
individuals the ability to sue to enforce their statutory rights.  
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998);13  see 
also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“The actual 
or threatened injury required by Art[icle] III may exist solely 
by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of 
which creates standing.” (citation, internal quotation marks, 
and ellipses omitted)); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 
614, 617 n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating 
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even 
though no injury would exist without the statute.”); Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982) 
                                                                                                     
admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures and 
compromise offers as proof of negligence or culpable 
conduct).  
 
13 Many cases focus on the question of whether 
Congress truly intended to create a private right of action and 
whether a particular individual was in the “zone of interests” 
of  the statute.  But traditionally, once it was clear that 
Congress intended to create an enforceable right and that an 
individual falls into the“zone of interests” that individual was 
found to have standing.  See Akins, 524 U.S. at 20. 
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(explaining that one “who has been the object of a 
misrepresentation made unlawful under [the statute] has 
suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended 
to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a 
claim for damages under the Act’s provisions”). 
 
 Despite those precedents, our pronouncements in this 
area have not been entirely consistent.  In some cases, we 
have appeared to reject the idea that the violation of a statute 
can, by itself, cause an injury sufficient for purposes of 
Article III standing.14  But we have also accepted the 
argument, in some circumstances, that the breach of a statute 
                                              
14 For instance, we have observed that “[t]he proper 
analysis of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff suffered 
an actual injury, not on whether a statute was violated.  
Although Congress can expand standing by enacting a law 
enabling someone to sue on what was already a de facto 
injury to that person, it cannot confer standing by statute 
alone.”  Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 199 F.3d 146, 153 
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act could not, by itself, confer standing without 
evidence “demonstrating more than a mere possibility” of 
harm); cf. Fair Hous. Council of Sub. Phila.  v. Main Line 
Times, 141 F.3d 439, 443-44 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a 
government agency could not sue on behalf of third parties 
injured by discriminatory advertisements because it could not 
“demonstrate that it has suffered injury in fact” (emphasis 
removed)). 
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is enough to cause a cognizable injury – even without 
economic or other tangible harm.15  
 
 Fortunately, a pair of recent cases touching upon this 
question, specifically in the context of statutes protecting data 
privacy, provide welcome clarity.  Those cases have been 
decidedly in favor of allowing individuals to sue to remedy 
violations of their statutory rights, even without additional 
injury. 
 
                                              
15 The Plaintiffs rely heavily upon Alston v. 
Countrywide Financial Corp., 585 F.3d 753 (3d Cir. 2009).  
That case involved a consumer class action in which 
homebuyers sought statutory treble damages under the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”).  They claimed 
that their private mortgage insurance premiums were funneled 
into an unlawful kickback scheme operated by their mortgage 
lender and its reinsurer, in violation of RESPA.  “The thrust 
of their complaint was that, in enacting and amending 
[RESPA], Congress bestowed upon the consumer the right to 
a real estate settlement free from unlawful kickbacks and 
unearned fees, and Countrywide’s invasion of that statutory 
right, even without a resultant overcharge, was an injury in 
fact for purposes of Article III standing.”  Id. at 755.  We 
agreed.  We emphasized that the injury need not be monetary 
in nature to confer standing and that RESPA authorizes suits 
by those who receive a loan accompanied by a kickback or 
unlawful referral.  Id. at 763.  That statutory injury – even 
where it did not also do any economic harm to the plaintiffs – 
was sufficient for purposes of Article III standing. 
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 First, in In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement 
Consumer Privacy Litigation, 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015), 
certain internet users brought an action against internet 
advertising providers alleging that their placement of so-
called “cookies” – i.e. small files with identifying information 
left by a web server on users’ browsers – violated a number 
of federal and state statutes, including the Stored 
Communications Act.  Id. at 133.  The defendants argued that 
because the users had not suffered economic loss as a result 
of the violations of the SCA, they did not have standing.  Id. 
at 134.  We emphasized that, so long as an injury “affect[s] 
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way,” the plaintiff 
need not “suffer any particular type of harm to have 
standing.”  Id.  (citation and internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Instead, “the actual or threatened injury 
required by Art[icle] III may exist solely by virtue of statutes 
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing,” 
even absent evidence of actual monetary loss.  Id. (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  
 
 We then reaffirmed Google’s holding in In re 
Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, 827 F.3d 262 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  That case involved a class action in which the 
plaintiffs alleged that Viacom and Google had unlawfully 
collected personal information on the Internet, including what 
webpages the plaintiffs had visited and what videos they 
watched on Viacom websites.  Id. at 267.  We addressed the 
plaintiffs’ basis for standing, relying heavily upon our prior 
analysis in Google, id. at 271-272, saying that, “when it 
comes to laws that protect privacy, a focus on economic loss 
is misplaced.”  Id. at 272-73 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Instead, “the unlawful disclosure of legally 
protected information” constituted “a clear de facto injury.”  
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Id. at 274.  We noted that “Congress has long provided 
plaintiffs with the right to seek redress for unauthorized 
disclosures of information that, in Congress’s judgment, 
ought to remain private.”  Id.  
 
 In light of those two rulings, our path forward in this 
case is plain.  The Plaintiffs here have at least as strong a 
basis for claiming that they were injured as the plaintiffs had 
in Google and Nickelodeon.16   
 
 Horizon nevertheless argues that the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 
(2016), compels a different outcome.  We disagree.  In 
Spokeo, a consumer sued a website operator for an allegedly 
willful violation of FCRA for publishing inaccurate 
information about him.  Id. at 1544.  The complaint did not 
include any allegation that the false information was actually 
used to the plaintiff’s detriment.  Id.; Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 
742 F.3d 409,411 (9th Cir. 2014).  Nonetheless, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff had standing because his “personal interests in the 
handling of his credit information” meant that the harm he 
suffered was “individualized rather than collective.”  Robins, 
742 F.3d at 413. 
 
 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded.  136 S. Ct. 
at 1550.  It highlighted that there are two elements that must 
                                              
16 Again, whether that injury is actionable under FCRA 
is a different question, one which we are presently assuming 
(without deciding) has an affirmative answer.  See supra note 
9.  
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be established to prove an injury in fact – concreteness and 
particularization.  Id. at 1545.  The Ninth Circuit had relied 
solely on the “particularization” aspect of the injury-in-fact 
inquiry and did not address the “concreteness” aspect.  Id.  
The Supreme Court therefore provided guidance as to what 
constituted a “concrete” injury and remanded to the Ninth 
Circuit to determine in the first instance whether the harm 
was concrete.  Id.   
 
 In laying out its reasoning, the Supreme Court rejected 
the argument that an injury must be “tangible” in order to be 
“concrete.”  Id. at 1549.  It noted that many intangible 
injuries have nevertheless long been understood as cognizable 
– for instance violations of the right to freedom of speech or 
the free exercise of religion.  Id.  It then explained that “both 
history and the judgment of Congress play important roles” in 
determining whether “an intangible injury constitutes injury 
in fact.”  Id.  There are thus two tests for whether an 
intangible injury can (despite the obvious linguistic 
contradiction) be “concrete.”  The first test, the one of history, 
asks whether “an alleged intangible harm” is closely related 
“to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a 
basis for a lawsuit in English or American Courts.”  Id.  If so, 
it is likely to be sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact element 
of standing.  Id.  But even if an injury was “‘previously 
inadequate in law,’” Congress may elevate it “‘to the status of 
[a] legally cognizable injur[y].’”  Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 578).  Because “Congress is well positioned to identify 
intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, 
its judgment is … instructive and important.”  Id.  The second 
test therefore asks whether Congress has expressed an intent 
to make an injury redressable. 
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 The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that 
congressional power to elevate intangible harms into concrete 
injuries is not without limits.  A “bare procedural violation, 
divorced from any concrete harm,” is not enough.  Id.  On the 
other hand, the Court said, “the violation of a procedural right 
granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to 
constitute injury in fact.  In other words, a plaintiff in such a 
case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one 
Congress has identified.”  Id.  
 
 Although it is possible to read the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Spokeo as creating a requirement that a plaintiff 
show a statutory violation has caused a “material risk of 
harm” before he can bring suit,17 id. at 1550, we do not 
believe that the Court so intended to change the traditional 
standard for the establishment of standing.  As we noted in 
Nickelodeon, “[t]he Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
                                              
17 Some other courts have interpreted Spokeo in such a 
manner – most notably the Eighth Circuit.  See Braitberg v. 
Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016) 
(concluding that, in light of Spokeo, the improper retention of 
information under the Cable Communications Policy Act did 
not provide an injury in fact absent proof of “material risk of 
harm from the retention”); see also Gubala v. Time Warner 
Cable, Inc., No. 15-CV-1078-PP, 2016 WL 3390415, at *4 
(E.D. Wis. June 17, 2016) (finding that, as a result of Spokeo, 
the unlawful retention of an individual’s personal information 
under the Cable Communications Policy Act did not 
constitute a cognizable injury absent a concrete risk of harm). 
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Spokeo … does not alter our prior analysis in Google.”  
Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 273 (citation omitted).  
 
 We reaffirm that conclusion today.  Spokeo itself does 
not state that it is redefining the injury-in-fact requirement.  
Instead, it reemphasizes that Congress “has the power to 
define injuries,” 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted), “that were previously inadequate in 
law.” Id.  (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
the absence of any indication to the contrary, we understand 
that the Spokeo Court meant to reiterate traditional notions of 
standing,18 rather than erect any new barriers that might 
prevent Congress from identifying new causes of action 
though they may be based on intangible harms.  In short, out 
of a respect for stare decisis, we assume that the law is stable 
unless there is clear precedent to the contrary.  And that 
means that we do not assume that the Supreme Court has 
altered the law unless it says so.  Cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a 
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet 
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 
                                              
18 Justice Thomas’s concurrence also illustrates that 
Spokeo was merely a restatement of traditional standing 
principles.  In that concurrence, he reiterated that a plaintiff is 
not required to “assert an actual injury beyond the violation of 
his personal legal rights to satisfy the ‘injury-in-fact’ 
requirement.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1552 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  Yet Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion 
in full.  And nowhere in his concurrence did he critique the 
majority for creating a new injury-in-fact requirement.   
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decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which 
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions.”).   
 
 It is nevertheless clear from Spokeo that there are some 
circumstances where the mere technical violation of a 
procedural requirement of a statute cannot, in and of itself, 
constitute an injury in fact.  136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Congress’ 
role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not 
mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact 
requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory 
right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate 
that right.”).  Those limiting circumstances are not defined in 
Spokeo and we have no occasion to consider them now.  In 
some future case, we may be required to consider the full 
reach of congressional power to elevate a procedural violation 
into an injury in fact, but this case does not strain that reach. 
 
 As we noted in Nickelodeon, “unauthorized 
disclosures of information” have long been seen as injurious.  
827 F.3d at 274 (emphasis added).  The common law alone 
will sometimes protect a person’s right to prevent the 
dissemination of private information.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652A (2016) (“One who invades the right 
of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting 
harm to the interests of the other.”); see also Samuel D. 
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. 
L. Rev. 193, 193 (1890) (advancing the argument for a “right 
to be let alone”).  Indeed, it has been said that “the privacy 
torts have become well-ensconced in the fabric of American 
law.”  David A. Elder, Privacy Torts § 1:1 (2016).  And with 
privacy torts, improper dissemination of information can 
itself constitute a cognizable injury.  Because “[d]amages for 
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a violation of an individual's privacy are a quintessential 
example of damages that are uncertain and possibly 
unmeasurable,” such causes of action “provide[] privacy tort 
victims with a monetary award calculated 
without proving actual damages.”  Pichler v. UNITE, 542 
F.3d 380, 399 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  
 
 We are not suggesting that Horizon’s actions would 
give rise to a cause of action under common law.  No 
common law tort proscribes the release of truthful 
information that is not harmful to one’s reputation or 
otherwise offensive.  But with the passage of FCRA, 
Congress established that the unauthorized dissemination of 
personal information by a credit reporting agency causes an 
injury in and of itself – whether or not the disclosure of that 
information increased the risk of identity theft or some other 
future harm.19  It created a private right of action to enforce 
                                              
19 Again, it is Congress’s decision to protect personal 
information from disclosure that “elevates to the status of 
legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that 
were previously inadequate in law.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 
(emphasis in original).  That is the focus of our decision 
today.  Nevertheless, we note our disagreement with our 
concurring colleague’s view that “the risk of future harm” in 
this case “requires too much supposition to satisfy Article III 
standing.”  (Concurring Op. at 6 n.5.)  The facts of this case 
suggest that the data breach did create a “material risk of 
harm.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550.  The information that was 
stolen was highly personal and could be used to steal one’s 
identity.  Id. (noting that with the “dissemination of an 
incorrect zip code,” it is difficult to see the risk of concrete 
 
28 
 
the provisions of FCRA, and even allowed for statutory 
damages for willful violations – which clearly illustrates that 
Congress believed that the violation of FCRA causes a 
concrete harm to consumers.20  And since the “intangible 
                                                                                                     
harm).  The theft appears to have been directed towards the 
acquisition of such personal information.  Cf. In re Sci. 
Applications Int’l. Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft 
Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (concluding that 
plaintiffs did not suffer an injury in fact as a result of the theft 
of devices with their personal information when it appeared 
that the theft was not directed at accessing the personal 
information).  The stolen laptops were unencrypted, meaning 
that the personal information was easily accessible.  Cf. id. 
(noting that the stolen data had been encrypted which made it 
unlikely that anyone could access it).  And Rindner alleged 
that he had already been a victim of identity theft as a result 
of the breach.  Cf. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 
F.3d 688, 692-95 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the plaintiff 
suffered an injury in fact in light of credible evidence that 
others had experienced identity theft as a result of the same 
breach).  Plaintiffs make a legitimate argument that they face 
an increased risk of future injury, which at least weighs in 
favor of standing.  
 
20 Congress’s decision to prohibit unauthorized 
disclosure of data is something that distinguishes this case 
from a prior case in which we addressed Article III standing 
after a data breach.  In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp, 664 F.3d 38 
(3rd Cir. 2011), we concluded that a security breach that 
compromised private information held by a payroll 
processing firm did not cause an injury in fact.  In that case, 
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harm” that FCRA seeks to remedy “has a close relationship to 
a harm [i.e. invasion of privacy] that has traditionally been 
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or 
American courts,” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549, we have no 
trouble concluding that Congress properly defined an injury 
that “give[s] rise to a case or controversy where none existed 
before.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 So the Plaintiffs here do not allege a mere technical or 
procedural violation of FCRA.21  They allege instead the 
                                                                                                     
the claims were based solely on the common law and 
concerned the increased risk of identity theft, the incurred 
costs, and the emotional distress suffered.  See id. at 40.  For 
those common law claims, we held that the plaintiffs did not 
have standing because their risk of harm was too speculative.  
See id. at 42.  In Reilly, the plaintiffs’ claims centered on the 
future injuries that they expected to suffer as a result of a data 
breach such as the increased risk of identity theft.  Id. at 40.  
And we concluded that those future injuries were too 
speculative.  Id at 42.  Here, in contrast, the Plaintiffs are not 
complaining solely of future injuries.  Congress has elevated 
the unauthorized disclosure of information into a tort.  And so 
there is nothing speculative about the harm that Plaintiffs 
allege.  
 
21 In this way, the failure to protect data privacy under 
FCRA is distinguishable from the Fifth Circuit’s recent 
treatment of a violation of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) as a result of improper “plan 
management.”  Lee v. Verizon Commc’ns. Inc., 837 F.3d 523, 
529 (5th Cir. 2016).  In that case, the court concluded that a 
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unauthorized dissemination of their own private information22 
– the very injury that FCRA is intended to prevent.23  There is 
                                                                                                     
participant’s interest was in his right to “the defined level of 
benefits” rather than in the procedural protections of the act.  
Id. at 530 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  A 
mere procedural violation, without proof of the diminution of 
benefits, was not a cognizable Article III injury.  Here, the 
privacy of one’s data is a cognizable interest even without 
consequent harm. 
 
22 Horizon has expressed concern that a reporting 
agency could be inundated with lawsuits for a technical 
breach of FCRA (such as failing to post a required 1-800 
number).  But in addition to concreteness, a plaintiff must 
also allege a particularized injury.  Here the Plaintiffs are 
suing on their own behalf with respect to the disclosure of 
their personal information.  See Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., 
Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that 
FCRA “creates an individual right not to have unlawful 
practices occur ‘with respect to’ one’s own credit 
information” (citations omitted)).  The particularization 
requirement may impose limits on the ability of consumers to 
bring suit due to more generalized grievances such as those 
mentioned by Horizon. 
 
23 Our conclusion that it was within Congress’s 
discretion to elevate the disclosure of private information into 
a concrete injury is strengthened by the difficulty that would 
follow from requiring proof of identity theft or some other 
tangible injury.  “[R]equiring Plaintiffs to wait for the 
threatened harm to materialize in order to sue would pose a 
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thus a de facto injury that satisfies the concreteness 
requirement for Article III standing.24  See In re Nickelodeon, 
                                                                                                     
standing problem of its own … .” In re Adobe Sys., Inc. 
Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 
2014).  Namely, the “more time that passes between a data 
breach and an instance of identity theft, the more latitude a 
defendant has to argue that the identity theft is not ‘fairly 
traceable’ to the defendant’s data breach.”  Id. 
 
24 The weight of precedent in our sister circuits is to 
the same effect.  See Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 
770 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that “’technical’ 
violations of the statute … are precisely what Congress 
sought to illegalize” and that therefore tangible harm is not 
required to confer standing); accord Remijas v. Neiman 
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(observing that the alleged harm suffered by the loss of 
privacy incurred by a data breach “go[es] far beyond the 
complaint about a website’s publication of inaccurate 
information” in Spokeo); Beaudry v. TeleCheck Services, Inc., 
579 F.3d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that bare 
procedural violations of FCRA are sufficient to confer 
standing); accord Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 
15-3386/3387, 2016 WL 4728027, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 
2016) (concluding that a data breach in violation of FCRA 
causes a concrete injury – at least when there is proof of a 
substantial risk of harm); see also Church v. Accretive Health, 
Inc., 654 Fed.Appx. 990, 993 (11th Cir. 2016) (concluding 
that a health company’s failure to provide required 
disclosures under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 
caused a concrete injury because Congress had created a right 
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827 F.3d 274 (concluding that the “unlawful disclosure of 
legally protected information” in and of itself constitutes a 
“de facto injury”).  Accordingly, the District Court erred 
when it dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing.25 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 Our precedent and congressional action lead us to 
conclude that the improper disclosure of one’s personal data 
in violation of FCRA is a cognizable injury for Article III 
standing purposes.  We will therefore vacate the District 
Court’s order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
                                                                                                     
and a remedy in the statute); Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & 
Cejda, L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act in the form of an unlawful demand for attorney’s fees – 
even where the fees are not actually paid and so no economic 
injury was inflicted – is a cognizable injury for Article III 
standing). 
 
25 The Plaintiffs also argue that they were injured by 
systematically overpaying for their Horizon insurance 
because “Horizon either did not allocate a portion of their 
premiums to protect their [personal information] or allocated 
an inadequate portion of the premiums to protect [personal 
information].”  (Opening Br. at 19-20.)  Because they have 
standing under FCRA, we do not reach that purported basis 
for standing; nor do we address Rindner’s alternative 
argument for standing based on the fraudulent tax return or 
his denial of credit. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 I agree with my colleagues that Plaintiffs have 
standing, but I reach this conclusion for different reasons.  In 
short, Plaintiffs allege that the theft of the laptops caused a 
loss of privacy, which is itself an injury in fact.  Thus, 
regardless of whether a violation of a statute itself constitutes 
an injury in fact, and mindful that under our precedent, a risk 
of identity theft or fraud is too speculative to constitute an 
injury in fact, see Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d 
Cir. 2011), Plaintiffs have nonetheless alleged an injury in 
fact sufficient to give them standing.     
 
I 
 
 As my colleagues have explained, Horizon Healthcare 
Services provides insurance to individuals in New Jersey.  
Horizon obtains personally identifiable information (“PII”), 
including names, dates of birth, and social security numbers, 
as well as protected health information (“PHI”), such as 
medical histories and test results, from its insureds.  This 
information is viewed as private and those in possession of it 
are required to ensure that it is kept secure and used only for 
proper purposes.   
 
 PII and PHI were stored on laptop computers kept at 
Horizon’s Newark, New Jersey headquarters.  In January, 
November, and December 2008, as well as April and 
November 2013, laptop computers were stolen.  The laptop 
computers stolen in November 2013 were cable-locked to 
workstations and password-protected, but the contents, which 
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included the PII/PHI of 839,000 people, were not encrypted.1  
Plaintiffs assert this theft places them at risk of future identity 
theft and fraud, and subjected them to a loss of privacy, in 
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 
et seq. (“FCRA”), and various state laws.  The District Court 
concluded that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a claim under 
the FCRA because the pleadings failed to allege any plaintiff 
suffered an injury in fact.2  
 
                                                          
1 My colleagues infer that these thefts were committed 
to obtain the PII/PHI.  Maj. Op. at 27 n.19.  I would not 
necessarily draw that inference.  Plaintiffs do not allege that 
any of the 839,000 individuals whose information was stored 
on the laptop computers, or on the laptop computers taken in 
the earlier thefts, suffered any loss or that their identities were 
misused.  Given the number of laptop computer thefts, and 
the absence of any allegation of a loss tied to their contents, it 
is at least equally reasonable to infer that the laptop 
computers were taken for their hardware, not their contents.  I 
acknowledge, however, that we are to draw a reasonable 
inference in Plaintiffs’ favor in the context of a facial 
challenge pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.  See Petruska 
v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he standard is the same when considering a facial attack 
under Rule 12(b)(1) or a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977) (explaining 
that Rule 12(b)(6) safeguards apply to facial attacks under 
Rule 12(b)(1) and provide that plaintiffs’ allegations are taken 
as true and all inferences are drawn in plaintiffs’ favor). 
2 The District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law claims.   
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II 
 
 As my colleagues accurately state, there are three 
elements of Article III standing: (1) injury in fact, or “an 
invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and 
particularized”; (2) traceability, that is a “causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) 
redressability, meaning a likelihood “that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”  Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
 
The injury-in-fact element most often determines 
standing.  See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 
(2016).  Such injury must be particularized and concrete.  Id. 
at 1548.  “For an injury to be particularized, it must affect the 
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”  Id.  (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  To be “concrete,” an 
injury must be “real” as opposed to “abstract,” but it need not 
be “tangible.”  Id. at 1548-49.    
 
As my colleagues eloquently explain, the Spokeo 
Court identified two approaches for determining whether an 
intangible injury is sufficient to constitute an injury in fact.  
Maj. Op. at 23 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).  Under the 
first approach, a court considers history and asks whether the 
intangible harm is closely related “to a harm that has 
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit 
in English or American courts.”  Id. at 1549; Maj. Op. at 23.  
If so, “it is likely sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
element of standing.”  Maj. Op. at 23 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1549).  Under the second approach, a court considers 
whether Congress has “expressed an intent to make an injury 
redressable.”  Maj. Op. at 23.  My colleagues rely on this 
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latter approach, but I rely on the former. 
 
The common law has historically recognized torts 
based upon invasions of privacy and permitted such claims to 
proceed even in the absence of proof of actual damages.  See, 
e.g., Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 399 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 621 n.3 (2004)); 
Restatement (Second) Torts §652A (2016) (stating that “[o]ne 
who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to 
liability for the resulting harm to the interest of the other”).  
While Plaintiffs do not allege that the laptop thieves looked at 
or used their PII and PHI, Plaintiffs lost their privacy once it 
got into the hands of those not intended to have it.  Cf. United 
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 n.5 
(3d Cir. 1980) (observing that “[p]rivacy . . . is control over 
knowledge about oneself” (citation omitted)).  While this may 
or may not be sufficient to state a claim for relief under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Maj. Op. at 27, the intangible harm from 
the loss of privacy appears to have sufficient historical roots 
to satisfy the requirement that Plaintiffs have alleged a 
sufficiently concrete harm for standing purposes.   
 
Our Court has embraced the view that an invasion of 
privacy provides a basis for standing.  In In re Google Cookie 
Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation, 806 F.3d 125 (3d 
Cir. 2015), and In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy 
Litigation, 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016), Google and 
Nickelodeon were alleged to have invaded the plaintiffs’ 
privacy by placing cookies into the plaintiffs’ computers, 
which allowed the companies to monitor the plaintiffs’ 
computer activities.  In these cases, the injury was invasion of 
privacy and not economic loss, and thus the standing analysis 
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focused on a loss of privacy.3  In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 
272-73; In re Google, 806 F.3d at 134.  Although the 
perpetrators of the invasion of privacy here are the laptop 
thieves and in Google and Nickelodeon the invaders were the 
defendants themselves, the injury was the same: a loss of 
privacy.  Thus, those cases provide a basis for concluding 
Plaintiffs here have suffered an injury in fact based on the 
loss of privacy.4 
 
III 
 
 While I have concluded that Plaintiffs have alleged an 
injury in fact by asserting that that they sustained a loss of 
privacy, the other grounds that Plaintiffs rely upon are 
unavailing.  Although this is not necessary for my analysis, I 
offer these observations to help explain the types of “injuries” 
that are not sufficient to provide standing in the context of 
data thefts.  First, under our precedent, the increased risk of 
identity theft or fraud due to a data breach, without more, 
                                                          
 3 My colleagues view In re Google Cookie Placement 
Consumer Privacy Litigation, 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015), 
and In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, 827 F.3d 
262 (3d Cir. 2016), as providing a basis for Plaintiffs to assert 
that a violation of the FCRA, without any resulting harm, 
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement.  I do not rely on the 
possible existence of a statutory violation as the basis for 
standing, and am not persuaded that these cases support that 
particular point.   
 4 I also conclude that Plaintiffs have sufficiently 
alleged that the injury was traceable, in part, to the failure to 
encrypt the data, and am satisfied that if proven, the injury 
could be redressable. 
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does not establish the kind of imminent or substantial risk 
required to establish standing.  See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42.  
Like in Reilly, the feared economic injury here depends on a 
speculative chain of events beginning with an assumption that 
the thief knew or discovered that the laptop contained 
valuable information, that the thief was able to access the data 
despite the password protection, and that the thief opted to 
use the data maliciously.5  See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42; see also 
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct 1138, 1150 n.5 
(2013).  Second, Reilly and Clapper have rejected Plaintiffs’ 
assertion that standing exists because they expended time and 
money to monitor for misuse of their information.  The 
Clapper Court reasoned that a plaintiff cannot “manufacture” 
standing by choosing to undertake burdens or “make 
expenditures” based on a “hypothetical future harm” that does 
not itself qualify as an injury in fact.  Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 
1050-51; see also Reilly, 664 F.3d at 46 (rejecting a claim for 
standing based upon “expenditures to monitor their financial 
information . . . because costs incurred to watch for a 
speculative chain of future events based on hypothetical 
future criminal acts are no more ‘actual’ injuries than the 
                                                          
 5 As noted earlier, my colleagues rely on the second 
approach, finding standing based upon a statutory violation.  
The alleged statutory violation here, however, creates only an 
increased risk of future harm.  Although Spokeo says that a 
violation of a statute can provide standing, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1549-50, standing still requires a showing of a concrete, 
particularized, nonspeculative injury in fact and, under Reilly, 
the link between the theft here and the risk of future harm 
requires too much supposition to satisfy Article III standing, 
Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42; see also Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148-
50. 
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alleged ‘increased risk of injury’ which forms the basis for 
Appellants’ claims”).6  The Supreme Court observed that to 
conclude otherwise would have problematic implications, as 
“an enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure a lower 
standard for Article III standing simply by making an 
expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear.”  Clapper, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1151.  Third, courts have rejected claims of standing 
based on assertions that plaintiffs suffered economic harm by 
paying insurance premiums that allegedly included additional 
fees for measures to secure PII/PHI, but such measures were 
not implemented.  See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus, 794 
F.3d 688, 694-95 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing this type of 
overpayment theory as “problematic” and suggesting that 
                                                          
 6 Plaintiffs also assert in a conclusory fashion that, “as 
a result of the Data Breach,” plaintiff Mitchell Rindner was 
the victim of identity theft.  While Plaintiffs allege that a false 
tax return was submitted to the Internal Revenue Service 
bearing Mr. Rindner’s and his wife’s names, and that 
someone used his credit card, the factual allegations do not 
show that these events were tied to theft.  First, the Amended 
Complaint does not allege that any of Mrs. Rindner’s PII/PHI 
was included in the stolen data.  Second, there is no allegation 
that the stolen data contained Mr. Rindner’s credit card 
information.  This leads to “[t]he inescapable conclusion . . . 
that [Rindner] has been subjected to another . . . data breach 
involving his financial . . . records.”  In re Sci. Applications 
Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. 
Supp. 3d 14, 32 (D.D.C. 2014).  Because Plaintiffs do not 
plausibly plead that this injury was “fairly traceable” to 
Horizon’s alleged failure to adequately guard Plaintiffs’ data, 
this particular injury fails to provide standing for a claim 
against Horizon.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. 
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such a theory is limited to the products liability context); Katz 
v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 77-78 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding 
that the “bare hypothesis” that brokerage fees were artificially 
inflated to cover security measures was implausible); In re 
Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft 
Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 30 (D.D.C. 2014) (rejecting the 
overpayment theory since the plaintiffs had paid for health 
insurance and did not allege that they were denied such 
coverage or services).7  Accordingly, none of these grounds 
provides a basis for standing in a data theft case like we have 
here. 
 
IV 
 
 For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.   
                                                          
 7 Plaintiffs identify two cases to support their 
overpayment theory: Resnick v. AcMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 
1328 (11th Cir. 2012), and In re Insurance Brokerage 
Antitrust Litigation, 579 F.3d 241, 264 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Neither supports their position.  Resnick’s endorsement of an 
overpayment theory occurred only in the context of a Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the claim for unjust 
enrichment, and was not used to support standing.  698 F.3d 
at 1323.  In re Insurance Brokerage involved a kickback 
scheme that artificially inflated premiums.  579 F.3d at 264.  
Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that the premiums they paid 
were artificially inflated because funds that were to be used 
for securing their data were not used for that purpose, nor do 
they allege that their premiums would otherwise have been 
cheaper.   
